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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant/Plaintiff,

(not incarcerated)

V.

PATRICIA SALAZAR HOUSTON,

Court of Appeals Case No. 20100246

Appellee/Defendant.

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over appeals
from courts of record in cases involving criminal charges below the first degree felony level.
Houston maintains that the State has failed to properly invoke this Court's jurisdiction, as the
order it appeals from is without prejudice, in violation of State v. Trover, 866 P.2d 528, 531
(Utah 1993).

ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION
1. Did the State properly appeal from an order of dismissal without prejudice?
This issue presents a question of law, to be decided for the first time on appeal by this
Court. See, e ^ , Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement Inc.. 2008 UT 82, U 11,199 P.3d 957.
This issue was properly raised for the first time in this Court in a motion for summary
dismissal after the State filed its notice of appeal.
2. Did the trial court properly conclude that suppression was required as a result of
the violation of the Fourth Amendment in the inception of the traffic stop?

This Court reviews findings of fact for clear error and applications of the law to facts
and conclusions of law for correctness. See, e.g.. Salt Lake City v. Bench. 2008 UT App 30,
115,177P.3d655.
This issue was raised in the trial court in a motion to suppress and memorandum (R.
74-102), explored at an evidentiary hearing (R. 142: 1-27), and ruled on by the trial court (R.
142: 33-36). This Court has full authority to affirm the ruling of the trial court on alternative
grounds in any event. See, e ^ , Keiter v. Keiter. 2010 UT App 169,127 n.12, 235 P.3d 782.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULE
Pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are copied in the addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
The State charged Houston by information with DUI, a third degree felony, being in
actual physical control of a vehicle with an alcohol level over .08, a third degree felony,
driving on an alcohol revoked or suspended license, a B misdemeanor, and having an open
container of alcohol in a vehicle, a C misdemeanor (R. 3-4). Jon Bunderson represented
Houston in the trial court (R. 6).
Trial counsel moved to suppress all evidence resulting from the traffic stop for lack of
a reasonable suspicion (R. 74-102). The State opposed the motion (R. 122-34). The trial
court, the Honorable Kevin Anderson, heard the evidence and granted the motion to
2

suppress (R. 142: 1-36).
Upon the motion of the prosecutor, the court dismissed the case without prejudice
(R.135, 137-38). The State filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 139).
Houston moved to dismiss the appeal in this Court. The Court ordered the issue to
be addressed in the briefs.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 8, 2008, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Rawlinson was off duty in the
Macey's parking lot visiting with Deputy Stewart when he saw Houston walk out: of the store
(R. 142: 6, 12-13). He told Stewart and Deputy Hanson, "That's Patricia Houston driving
that vehicle, and she's revoked for alcohol if you want to go stop her." (R. 142: 13-14).
Deputy Stewart then followed her, engaged his lights and sirens, and conducted a level two
stop of Houston's car on suspicion that she was driving on a revoked license (R. 142: 24-25,
27). He was unsure if he had called in to dispatch prior to the stop, but was certain he had
not verified the status of her license through dispatch prior to stopping her; his stop was
based solely on Rawlinson's comments (R. 142: 24-27).
Rawlinson's familiarity with Houston stemmed from his participation in her two DUI
arrests in 2006, and her two citations in 2007 for driving on revocation (R. 142: 7-12). He
testified that he was "fairly sure" her license was revoked through 2012 when he arrested her
for DUI in 2006 (R. 142: 9-11,16), but then acknowledged that if she had been convicted of
the first DUI, it would have resulted in a 90 day suspension, and that if she had been
convicted of the second DUI, it would have resulted in a six month or year suspension (R.
3

142: 16-17). Further, he did not testify that Houston was convicted of any of these offenses,
but testified that he was unsure of whether she was convicted of the DUI (singular) (R. 142:
9). Nor did he testify that she ever refused a breath test in her prior DUI arrests.
He apparendy was not convinced of a suspension through 2012, as he testified that he
verified through dispatch that Houston's license was revoked before he cited her twice for
driving on revocation in 2007, and made no claim that it was revoked through 2012 at that
time (R. 142: 11). He also testified that a couple of days prior to the November of 2008
stop, he had been at the Driver's License Division when Houston's name came up, as it
often did (R. 142: 14). He testified that he knew her license was revoked when he told the
deputies that, because he had seen information on the Driver's License Division's computer
when he was in the office. However, he never specified what that information was (R. 142:
14-15).
Trooper Rawlinson testified that he would have called dispatch or used his computer
to check on a complaint of someone driving with a revoked license even if the complainant
were someone who worked at the Driver's License Division (R. 142: 20).
The trial court granted the motion to suppress in a lengthy oral ruling that was not
reduced to written findings and conclusions (R. 142: 33-36). The ruling is in the addendum
to this brief. The court ruled that Deputy Stewart lacked a reasonable suspicion to justify the
stop (R. 142: 33). The court initially recognized that Trooper Rawlinson's information may
have been unfounded, stating,
We can't have officers just telling people - telling other officers to pull other
people over because they think they have something. It may be that there was
a computer glitch. It may be that her license was reinstated. Then there's a lot
4

of things
(R. 142: 34). But the court also indicated that if Trooper Rawlinson had told Deputy Stewart
about what he saw at the Driver's License Division a few days prior, this would have risen to
the requisite level (R. 142: 35). The court indicated that Deputy Stewart should have called
in to dispatch because another officer's telling him to pull her over did not provide a
reasonable suspicion (R. 142: 35). The court acknowledged the difference between probable
cause required to obtain a warrant and reasonable suspicion to justify a stop, but nonetheless
encouraged the officers to obtain more than just a statement from a fellow officer to justify a
traffic stop (EL 142: 36).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Because the order appealed from is without prejudice, it violates State v. Trover, 866
P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1993). There is a reasonable possibility of re-filing of the charges and
prosecution in the event this Court affirms the suppression order. Dismissal of the appeal is
in order to protect against this possibility and comply with Trover.
Trooper Rawlinson did not have a reasonable suspicion to justify Deputy Stewart's
stop of Houston's car. As the trial court recognized, Houston's license may have been
reinstated at the time of the stop, or Rawlinson's prior information may have been the result
of a computer glitch or other problem. Police must quickly verify a driver's license status
before conducting traffic stops on suspicion of revocation. Otherwise, anyone who ever had
a suspended or revoked license would be perpetually subject to seizure.

5

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE STATE'S APPEAL.

The State argues that this appeal is properly before this Court because the current
version of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1 does not require dismissal with prejudice, and because
the record reflects that the State's case was substantially impaired by the suppression order.
State's brief at 7-14.
State v. Trover. 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993), requires that before the prosecution can
file an appeal of right from an adverse ruling on a suppression ruling, the State must obtain
an order of dismissal with prejudice certifying that the suppression ruling has substantially
impaired the prosecution or has rendered the State unable to proceed. See id. at 531; State v.
Gkon, 866 P.2d 1114, 1115-16 (Utah App. 1997). The Trover court put these requirements
in place to insure that the State is not given the ability to appeal as a matter of right from all
adverse pretrial rulings, and thereby circumvent the appellate courts' discretion to choose
which cases to take on interlocutory appeal. Trover. 866 P.2d at 531. The requirement that
the dismissal be with prejudice bars the prosecution from proceeding if they do not prevail
on appeal, and is designed to insure that the prosecution will not appeal lightly or abuse its
right to appeal. Id.
The State is correct that total impairment of its case need not be shown. Nor is a
certification of substantial impairment essential if the record reflects that the State is not able
to proceed with the majority of its case as a result of the suppression ruling. State v.
Cushing. 2004 UT App 73, ffl| 17, 88 P.3d 368; State's brief at 12. However, it is critical that
the State dismiss its cases with prejudice or that the record otherwise establishes that re-filing
6

of charges will not occur in the event of affirmance on appeal.
In the instant matter, trial counsel for Houston and the trial court both made
statements reflecting that the ruling on the motion to suppress apparently substantially
impaired the government's case. However, the prosecutor made no such representation
Compare R. 142: 29, 36 with R. 142: 30-33. Rather, as soon as the court granted the
suppression motion, the prosecutor expressly moved the court to dismiss without prejudice,
and the court granted this motion (R. 135, 137-38, R. 142: 36-37). Thus, contrary to Trover,
even in the event this Court affirms the lower court, the prosecution can nonetheless
proceed with its prosecution of Houston. But see idWhile the State on appeal argues that there is sufficient indicia that the State cannot
re-file the charges in the event this Court affirms the trial court, State's brief at 13-14, the
trial prosecutor has not made any such representations, and it is not know what other
evidence the State may have or obtain against Ms. Houston. For instance, the State might
choose to proceed with testimony that the police saw Houston driving prior to the stop, and
find employees or customers who interacted with Houston in the Macey's store to attest to
her signs of inebriation. Particularly where she is charged with two enhanced felony DUIs
and driving on an alcohol revoked license, further prosecution by a motivated prosecutor is
not an unrealistic possibility.
At the time of Trover, the version of the statute governing prosecutorial rights to
appeal, 77-18a-l (1993), provided in relevant part:
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal
7

(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence
when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal
would be in the interest of justice.
The statute was substantially amended in 2005, and currently includes Trover's substantial
impairment language. It provides in relevant part:
(3) The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony
information following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial;
(b) a pretrial order dismissing a charge on the ground that the court's
suppression of evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's case[.]
While the legislature adopted the substantial impairment language of Trover, it did not
overrule Trover's requirement of dismissal with prejudice. Our courts recognize a
presumption that the legislature is aware of the common law at the time the legislature enacts
statutes, and the courts do not infer legislative intent to overrule the common law unless the
legislative intent to overrule is expressed. See, e.g., C.T. ex rel Taylor v. Johnson. 1999 UT
35, Tf 33, 977 P.2d 479 (Zimmerman, J., dissenting) ("c[I]t is not to be presumed that the
legislature intended to abrogate ... a rule of the common law by enactment of a statute upon
the same subject.... The fact that a statute contains a partial codification of a particular rule or
principle of the common law does not necessarily abrogate the remainder of the common
law...' 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 185 (1974)."). See also Gottling v. P.R. Inc.. 2002 UT 95,ffl[
14 and 29, 61 P.3d 989 (Durham, C.J., dissenting and majority not contesting this point of
statutory construction) ('"The legislature is presumed to know the common law which
existed before the enactment of a statute, and 'absent an indication that the legislature
8

intends a statute to supplant common law, the courts should not give it that effect' " (quoting
Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Stat. Constr. § 50.01, at 422 (4th *999 ed.1984)); see also
Tucson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Schantz. 5 Ariz.App. 511, 428 P.2d 686, 690 (Ariz.1967); Hechter
v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.. 46 N.Y.2d 34, 412 N.Y.S.2d 812, 385 N.E.2d 551, 554 (1978).")
(footnote omitted). Because the legislature expressed no intent to overrule it, Trover's
requirement of dismissal with prejudice remains binding on the courts. See id.
The State's contention on the cover and on page 6 of its brief that the appeal is from
a "final" order apparently seeks to avoid the final judgment rule. This rule recognizes that
appeals are not properly taken from non-final orders which fail to end the controversy
between the parties. See, e.g., Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3; In re Southern American
Insurance Company, 930 P.2d 276, 278 (Utah App. 1996). An order of dismissal without
prejudice does not end the controversy between Houston and the State, but instead permits
the State to proceed with the prosecution. Cf, e.g.. State v. Cushing, 2004 UT App 73, ^f 13,
88 P.3d 368.
Because the order appealed from is not with prejudice, it failed to properly invoke this
Court's jurisdiction, and the Court should dismiss the appeal. See Bradbury v. Valencia,
2000 UT 50,1f 8, 5 P.3d 649 (recognizing that dismissal of appeal is remedy for improperly
pursued appeal).
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II.

BECAUSE THE STOP WAS UNSUPPORTED BY REASONABLE
SUSPICION, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF SUPPRESSION
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

Traffic stops and other detentions must be justified in their inception by objectively
based reasonable articulable suspicions of crime. See, e.g.. State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ^f
13, 996 P.2d 546 (Utah 2000) (discussing both state and federal constitutional law to this
effect and recognizing that Article I § 14 is interpreted independently to provide greater
protection than the Fourth Amendment); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah
1994)(discussing federal law to this effect); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)(same).
A police officer may conduct a traffic stop or other detention without personally
having a reasonable suspicion, provided that the officer is relying on information from
another officer who does harbor the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion. See, e.g..
State v. Roybal, 2010 UT 34,1f 21, 232 P.3d 1016. The officer conducting a traffic stop or
detention in reliance on another officer's reasonable suspicion is entitled to act thereon
forthwith, and need not be informed of the details underlying the originating officer's
reasonable suspicion. See, e ^ , State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1277-78 and n.5 (Utah App.
1994). The proper focus of analysis in this case thus turns on whether Trooper Rawlinson,
the originating officer, harbored a reasonable articulable suspicion of crime. See id. The
State's arguments to this effect on pages 15 through 20 of its brief are correct.
Trooper Rawlinson did not have the requisite suspicion on the date of the stop.
While he testified he was "fairly sure" Houston's license was suspended through 2012 when
he checked it in 2006 (R. 142: 9-11, 16), he conceded that if she had been convicted of the
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first DUI, it would have resulted in a 90 day suspension, and that if she had been convicted
of the second DUI, it would have resulted in a six month or year suspension (R. 142: 16-17).
Further, he did not testify that Houston was convicted of any of these offenses, but testified
that he was unsure of whether she was convicted of the DUI (singular) (R. 142: 9). Nor did
he testify that she ever refused a breath test in her prior DUI arrests. He checked the status
of her license before citing her for driving on revocation in 2007 (R. 142: 11), and made no
claim that it was revoked until 2012 when he checked it in 2007. He did not testify as to
what he saw on the Driver's License Division's computer when he looked at it a couple of
days prior to the stop (R. 142: 14-15).
As the trial court found, Houston's license may have been reinstated on the date of
Deputy Stewart's stop, or there may have been a computer glitch in the past (R.142: 34).
This finding is not clearly erroneous, but is instead supported by Trooper Rawlin son's
testimony that he would check with dispatch or on his computer prior to stopping for a
suspicion of a revoked license, even if he had been told by someone working at the Driver's
License Division that a license were revoked (R. 142: 20). His course of conduct in
rechecking the status of Houston's license, despite being "fairly sure" it had been revoked
through 2012 (R. 142: 9-11, 16) reflects police knowledge that license status changes over
time for a variety of reasons.
Houston history of past arrests and license revocation did not give rise to a reasonable
suspicion of present crime. If the law were otherwise, anyone with a revoked or suspended
license in his or her history would be subject to perpetual detention and investigation by the
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police, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I § 14. See State v. Dennis, 2007
Ut App 266, T| 12, 167 P.3d 528. As this Court explained in Dennis,
Criminal history alone is also "insufficient to give rise to the necessary
reasonable suspicion" to shift the focus of a traffic stop to an investigation of
criminal activity. United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir.1997);
see also United States v. Sandoval 29 F.3d 537, 543 (10th Cir.1994) ("If the
law were otherwise, any person with any sort of criminal record ... could be
subjected to a Terry-type investigative stop by a law enforcement officer at any
time without the need for any other justification at all").

Id. at U 12.
Utah case law confirms by comparison that Rawlinson did not harbor a reasonable
articulable suspicion based on his past understanding of Houston's licenses' status. In State
v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987) (per curiam),1 the court affirmed a traffic stop
wherein the officer recognized a driver as someone whose license had been revoked as of
earlier in the week, and the passenger as someone who had a warrant outstanding. The
officer checked with and verified the revoked license and the warrant prior to approaching
the two in the car, which apparently stopped when the officer was following it. The court
approved of the officer's verification of the license status and warrant through dispatch
before approaching the car, finding that the facts gave rise to a reasonable suspicion. Id. at
126.
In contrast, in State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1983), the court recognized that

Constantino's standing analysis has been called into question by other cases. See, e.g.
.State v. Marshall 791 P.2d 880, 885 n.6 (Utah App. 1990), overruled on other grounds. State
v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99,144, 37 P.3d 1073.and State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1134 n.3 (Utah
1994).
12

an officer had reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop on September 21, 1981, because
he had arrested the defendant for DUI on January 1, 1981, when the defendant refused to
take a breath test. The officer verified revocation of the license as a result of the DUI
conviction on June 1, 1981, and at that time, a refusal resulted in a one year suspension of
the license.. See id. at 1303-04 and n.l. It was on the basis of all of these facts that the
supreme court found a reasonable suspicion. Compare id. with State's brief at 22-23
(overlooking the details concerning the legal effect of the refusal).
In contrast here, there was no testimony that Rawlinson was aware of any convictions
or refusals, or that he had verified or had knowledge that Houston's license was still
suspended on the date of the stop.
Trooper Rawlinson's practice of calling dispatch or using his computer to check on
revoked licenses is something he would follow even if he received a complaint from
someone working at the Driver's License Division (R. 142: 20). This a prudent course of
conduct which takes very little time and effort and comports with the Fourth Amendment.
See Constantino, supra.
To the extent the trial court's analysis differs from Houston's, this Court has full
authority to affirm the suppression order on any proper ground. . See, e^g., Keiter v. Keiter,
2010 UT App 169,127 n.12, 235 P.3d 782.
Thus, in the event this Court does not dismiss the appeal, the Court is requested to
affirm the order of suppression on the bases explained above.

13

CONCLUSION
This Court should dismiss the appeal for failure to obtain a dismissal with prejudice,
as Trover requires. Alternatively, the Court should affirm the trial court's order of
suppression.
Respectfully submitted this

day of October, 2010.

JlizdUeth ftUirit
Counsel for Ms. Houston

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the H i day of October, 2010,, I hand-delivered two true and
correct copies of the foregoing and a disk containing a PDF of the brief to Assistant
Attorney General Kris C. Leonard, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854.
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ADDENDUM

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULE

Constitution of Utah, Article I § 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l (2010)
(1) A defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from:
(a) a final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of the defendant;
(c) an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a pending
prosecution; or
(d) an order denying bail, as provided in Subsection 77-20-1(7).
(2) In addition to any appeal permitted by Subsection (1), a defendant may seek discretionary
appellate review of any interlocutory order.
(3) The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information following a
refusal to bind the defendant over for trial;
(b) a pretrial order dismissing a charge on the ground that the court's suppression of
evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's case;
(c) an order granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest;
(d) an order arresting judgment or granting a motion for merger;
(e) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double jeopardy or denial of
a speedy trial;
(f) an order granting a new trial;
(g) an order holding a statute or any part of it invalid;

(h) an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a pending
prosecution;
(i) an order finding, pursuant to Tide 77, Chapter 19, Part 2, Competency for Execution, that
an inmate sentenced to death is incompetent to be executed;
(j) an order reducing the degree of offense pursuant to Section 76-3-402; or
(k) an illegal sentence.
(4) In addition to any appeal permitted by Subsection (3), the prosecution may seek
discretionary appellate review of any interlocutory order entered before jeopardy attaches.

U t a h Code Ann. § 77-18a-l (1993)

(1) A n appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate court decides the
appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental disease or defect
incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(2) A n appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double jeopardy or denial of
a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence when upon a
petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal would be in the interest of
justice; or
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest.

U t a h Rule of Appellate Procedure 3
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a district or juvenile
court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments,
except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court
within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than die timely
filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such
action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other
sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.

(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to appeal from a judgment or
order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of
appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be
consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by
stipulation of the parties to the separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the appellant and the
adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be changed in
consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original
proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the
petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the
appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the
court from which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a notice
of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of each party to the
judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last
known address. A certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the notice of appeal. If
counsel of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate the name of the party
represented by that counsel.
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a
civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court the filing fee established
by law. The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal regardless of whether the filing
fee has been paid. Failure to pay the filing fee within a reasonable time may result in dismissal.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall
immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, and a
statement by the clerk indicating whether the filing fee was paid and whether the cost bond required
by Rule 6 was filed. Upon receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court
shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the
action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the
name of the appellant, such name shall be added to the title.

TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
AND DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

1

- police to police.

So clearly, that's the information -

2

that's the flyer that was given, and Roybal says that,

3

"Officers can rely on other sources of information, including

4

bulletins or flyers received from other law enforcement."

5

That's exactly what we have here.

6

issued the flyer or bulletin possess reasonable suspicion to

7

justify the stop."

8

had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop.

9

that he had probable cause, if not actual knowledge that she

"So long as the police who

And with Trooper Rawlinson, obviously he
I would submit

10

was driving on a suspended license because of his previous

11

interactions with Ms. Houston.

12

Deputy Stewart - and I'm not saying that that was

13

communicated to Deputy Stewart, but that didn't need to be

14

communicated to Deputy Stewart according the Case law.

15

was communicated is that it was Patricia Houston; that her

16

license was revoked, and that she was alcohol restricted.

17

Based upon that information Deputy Stewart's suspicion was

18

reasonable.

19

What

I don't have any further argument.

THE COURT: All right.

On the defendant's motion to

20

suppress based on the allegation there's no reasonable

21

suspicion for the arresting officer, Deputy Stewart, to have

22

pulled over Ms. Houston in the first place, I'm granting that

23

motion to suppress. There was no reasonable suspicion held by

24

Deputy Stewart, the arresting officer, at the time he pulled

25

Ms. Houston over.
33

1

I agree with the State that the information from

2

the highway patrolman is not the same as a citizen because

3

certainly he has more knowledge and information than a

4

citizen, but this is the very reason why we have these rules.

5

We can't have officers just telling people - telling other

6

officers to pull other people over because they think they

7

have something.

8

It may be that her license was reinstated.

9

lot of things that could have happened. These rules prevent

It may be that there was a computer glitch.
Then there's a

10

that kind of abuse.

11

here or that that was the intent at all.

12

trying to do their job, but simply you have to have

13

something.

14

Now, I'm not saying that there was abuse
These officers are

Let me take a minute just to help the officers, at

15

least in my perspective, understand.

Deputy Stewart should

16

have called into dispatch.

17

this.

18

didn't talk about it here today.

19

confirmation from dispatch that a license was revoked and

20

that this person was doing it, that - we wouldn't be here.

21

This wouldn't be an issue.

That would have solved all of

I don't - there's some evidence that he did and he
But if he would have had

22

So follow her around, follow her to her house,

23

whatever he had to do until you get that confirmation or

24

until you see a driving violation, then you have reasonable

25 I suspicion to pull them over. But until then, just another
34

officer saying, "Hey, go pull her over. She's driving on a
suspended license," that just doesn't rise to the level.
Now, if you had received further information from
Trooper Rawlinson such as I was down at the Driver's License
Division a few days ago and I looked at the computer screen
and I saw all this stuff, if he articulated that to you then
that certainly rises to the level.
I know this is difficult to understand sometimes,
we litigate about this stuff all the time, so it's no clear
bright line rule and it's difficult for you guys as your
sitting out there making quick decisions as to how to do it.
But in this particular case, there just was no reasonable
suspicion to pull her over.
Let me give you another example.

Lots of times a

CI will come to other cops and say, "Hey, listen, I was at
this party the other night, they were smoking pot."

And this

is a reliable CI. I see these in search warrants all the
time. Those officers will still go and do something to verify
that information. They'll go and pull the trash and they'll
verify that those people live there.

They'll look for

discarded, you know, baggies of marijuana, whatever it is.
They'll do something. Or they'll sit and watch the house and
see if there's a lot of activity coming to the house.
Something to verify what the CI has told them before they get
on the [inaudible] and get a warrant.
35

1

I know that a stop is different than a PC but the

2

principles are the same.

You're trying to find something

3

where you come in here and articulate, if you have something

4

like this.

5

okay, if there's a defense attorney out there that's going to

6

try to get me on this - and I don't mean get you - but call

7

me on this and make sure it's right, what am I going to say

8

in court? How am I going to articulate what I saw; what I

9

witnesses; what I was able to come back here in court and

Lots of times it's best just to think, Well,

10

tell the judge, this is why I pulled them over?

11

statement, she has a revoked license and you wanted to stop

12

her is not even close to that level.

13

have to have more than just a statement.

14

more than that.

15

And a short

Essentially the - you
You have to have

Now, having said that, just housekeeping. I don't

16

know much about you or about your cases other than what I've

17

heard in this case here, but it's obvious you have a serious

18

problem.

19

proceed from here but I don't see how they can proceed

20

without the information from the stop.

21
22

You are being - they can chose how they want to

I'm begging you, just - you're going to hurt
yourself or you're going to hurt somebody else. (Inaudible).

23

Mr. McAdams?

24 I

MR. MCADAMS: At this time the State moves to

25

dismiss without prejudice, Your Honor.
36

THE COURT: All right.

So with that the court is in

recess.
MR. BUNDERSON: And dismissed. The record will show
the case is dismissed?
THE COURT: Yes.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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MINUTE ENTRY, MOTION AND ORDER FOR DISMISSAL

FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
MOTION HEARING

vs.
PATRICIA SALAZAR HOUSTON,
Defendant.

Case No: 081101296 FS
Judge:
KEVIN K ALLEN
Date:
February 16, 2 010

PRESENT
Clerk:
janetfr
Prosecutor: WALSH, SPENCER D
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): BUNDERSON, JON J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: July 28, 1960
Video
Tape Number:
Courtroom 6

Tape Count: 9:26-10:15

CHARGES
All charges disposed
HEARING
TAPE: Courtroom 6
COUNT: 9:26-10:15
On record. Case called. The Court notes the motion to suppress
and motion in limine and the issue to be argued today is that of
che stop.
COUNT: 9:39
Trooper Phil Rawlinson is sworn, testifies, and is cross-examined.
COUNT: 9:48
Deputy Avery Stewart is sworn, testifies, and is cross-examined.
COUNT: 9:57
Defense closing arguments.
COUNT: 10:02
State closing arguments.
The Court grants the Motion to Suppress finding there was no
reasonable suspicion by the arresting officer for the stop.
The State moves to dismiss without prejudice. The Court grants
the dismissal, and the case is dismissed without prejudice.
Off record.
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ANDREW MCADAMS, 11716
Deputy Cache County Attorney
199 North Main, 3rd Floor
Logan, UT 84321
(435)755-1860
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PATRICIA SALAZAR HOUSTON
DOB: 07/28/1960
Defendant.
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MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
AND ORDER FOR DISMISSAL
CASE NO.: 081101296
JUDGE KEVIN ALLEN

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
COMES NOW, ANDREW MCADAMS, Deputy Cache County Attorney, and
hereby moves the Court for an order of dismissal without prejudice.
DATED this 16 Day of February, 2010.

Andrew McAdams
Deputy Cache County Attorney

l

ORDER
UPON reviewing the foregoing Motion for Dismissal, it is hereby ORDERED that
the above entitled case is dismissed.
DATED this _ l £ _ day of February, 2010.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Jon Bunderson,
Attorney for the defendant, at 45 N 100 E, Brigham City, UT 84032.
DATED this 16 Day of February, 2010.

Roswitha K. Brown
Legal Assistant
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